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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

VITO TODARO and GUISEPPE
FONTANA,
Appellants,
Case No. 8239

vs.

]. D. GARDNER,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 20, 1948, the Respondent filed his complaint
in the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the
County of Maricopa, (Exhibit P-14) wherein he alleges that
on the 28th day of June 1947 he loaned to appellants the
sum of $5,000.00, and in his second cause of action in said
complaint contained he sets forth and alleges the particulars
under which he allegedly loaned the Appellants said $5,000.00.

3
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The appellants filed their answer and later an amended
answer to said complaint, denying the loan, but alleging that
the respondent entered into an agreement with the appellants
to purchase a certain motel of the appellants located in Arizona and attached to said (Exhibit P-14) is the agreement
proposed but not signed by said parties.
The matter went to trial in said Superior Court, and at
the conclusion of evidence, judgment was entered in favor of
respondent, J. D. Gardner, and against the appellants herein
for said sum of $5,000.00.
Appellants herein then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Arizona, and said judgment of the Superiod Court of Maricopa
County was reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court
with directions to enter judgment for the defendants, ( appellants herein) (Exhibit P-18).
Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Arizona,
the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, accordingly
entered judgment in favor of the appallants herein and against
the respondent herein for the sum of $5,000.00 with interest
at 6% per annum from June 27, 1949 until paid together
with accruing costs until paid, in the sum of $247.55 (Exhibit

A).
On January 18, 1952 the appellants herein filed an action
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against the respondent herein
upon the judgment of the Superior Court of Maripoca County,
Arizona, and that the same had not been paid (R-1).
4
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The responden, J. D. Gardner, filed his answer to said
complaint, (R-4), admitting the allegations of paragraphs
1 and 2 of said complaint and admitting that on the 5th day
of July 1951, an action was pending in the court of said Maricopa County, Arizona between said parties and that said parties had appeared in said action in person and by counsel
and denies the other allegations of paragraph 3· of said complaint, and further denying that the defendant therein, ( respondent herein) is indebted to appellants, herein and admits
that no sum has been paid to appellants.
Respondent then interposes a "First affirmative defense"
in which he alleges in substance that on the 28th day of June,
1947 he advanced to appellants herein the sum of $5,000.00
to be used as a down payment on the purchase price of a motel
upon the express conditions precedent that said money was
only to be retained by the appellants herein if after further
investigation the defendant, (respondent herein) was reasonably convinced that there was no risk involved to the operation
of the property because of certain reasons he sets forth in
his affirmative defense and that after investigation the respondent herein concluded that he would not go through with
the agreement and that appellants were obligated to repay
said $5,000.00 to respondent herein (Tr. 4).
Pursuant thereto appellants herein filed a "Motion to
Strike (Tr. 6), moving the court to strike from the answer of
respondent herein said First Affirmative defense upon the
grounds that said defense was not a pleadable defense to the
complaint of the appellants herein, and that said affirmative
defense does not state facts sufficient to entitle said respondent

5
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herein to relief. Said motion was argued before the court
and the appellants' herein motion to strike was denied (Tr. 8)
and in due course the cause was set down for trial.
At the trial of the cause and after the appellants rested
their case the respondent herein proceeded to introduce evidence in support of his affirmative defense, which evidence
was timely objected to by appellants herein, upon the grounds
that such evidence is not a pleadable defense to this action
and that it does not state facts sufficient to entitle the defendant
to any relief and that such matters are res adjudicata and same
cannot be gone into as a set-off or counterclaim or otherwise,
and that the court is not permitted to go into the merits of
such a defense and that the court must give full faith and
credit to the judgment of the State of Arizona. The court
then overruled the objection and proceeded to trial (Tr. 1617-18).
The court then took the matter under advisement and
later rendered his decision in favor of the appellants herein for
the sum of $5,000.00 together with interest and court costs
and directed counsel for appellants to prepare and file findings
of facts and conclusions of law and judgment in accordance
therewith (Tr. 90-90-91)Respondent herein then files an objection to finding of
fact and conclusion of law and judgment (Tr. 92). The matter
was then argued and a brief of appellant was filed with the
court on said matter which is contained in the exhibits but
no mark of exhibit placed thereon. The court then took the
matter under advisement and later reversed the court's decision
and rendered judgment in favor of respondent for the sum

6
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of $5,000.00 and interest at 6% per annum from the 5th day
of September, 1947 to the 2nd day of November, 1949 in the
sum of $647.50, and likewise rendered judgment in favor of
the appellants herein for the sum of $5,000.00 plus court
costs in the sum of $247.55, and concluded in the end that
judgment for respondent should be in the net sum of $399.95.
During the course of the trial and during the pre-trial
it was agreed between counsel for the respective parties that
pending the appeal of the cause of action in Arizona, the
appellants herein had paid back to the respondent herein said
sum of $5,000.00 as is disclosed by paragraph 5 of the pretrial order (Tr.lO).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE APPELLANT TO STRIKE FROM THE ANSWER
OF THE RESPONDENT, THE RESPONDENT'S FIRST
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THAT SAID ALLEGATIONS DO NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE DEFENDANT TO RELIEF.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE OBJECTION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY EVIDENCE OF THE RESPONDENT IN
7
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SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S FIRST AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE AND THAT SAID DEFENSE DOES NOT
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT
TO ANY RELIEF.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
FOR THE RESPONDENT.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
FOR THE RESPONDENT FOR THE SUM OF $5,000.00
AND INTEREST THEREON IN THE SUM OF $647.50,
OR A NET JUDGMENT OF $399.95, AS A SET OFF OR
COUNTERCLAIM OR OTHERWISE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE APPELLANT TO STRIKE FROM THE ANSWER
OF THE RESPONDENT, THE RESPONDENT'S FIRST
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THAT SAID ALLEGATIONS DO NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE DEFENDANT TO RELIEF.
8
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It is apparently the contention of the respondent herein,
that the defense interposed by him in this action was apparently
not adjudicated in the Courts of Arizona in the original action,
inasmuch as Respondent proceeded upon the theory of a loan
and the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the judgment of
the Superior Court on this theory, and the Respondent apparently now contends he has a right to interpose a defense or
cause of action upon a different theory, which he apparently
contends was not determined by the Arizona Courts.
It is the contention of the Appellant herein, in support
of his appeal, that:
(a) That the affirmative defense interposed by Respondent in his answer to the complaint of the
Appellant is res adjudicata and Respondent cannot
again interpose a defense which would go to the
merits of the case.
30 American Jur. Page 919, Par. 175.
"The application of the doctrine of res judicata to
identical causes of action does not depend upon the
identity or difference in the forms of the two actions.
A judgment upon the merits bars a subsequent suit upon
the same cause, though brought in a different form of
action, and a party therefore cannot, by varying the
form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting his cause, escape the operation of the principal that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated. On the other hand, the fact that a
different form or measure of relief is asked does not
preclude the application of the j~dgr;?ent to estop
the maintenance of the second actwn. Freeman on
Judgments, 5th Ed. Par. 684, pp. 1443 and 1444.

9
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30 American Jr. Page 920, Par. 178.
"It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that
material facts or questions which were in issue in a
former action, and were there admitted or judicially
determined are conclusively settled by a judgment
rendered therein and that such facts or questions become res judicata, and may not again be litigated in
a subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies, regardless of the form the issue may take
in the subsequent action, whether the subsequent action
involves the same or different form of proceeding, or
whether the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action, subject matter, claim, or demand,
as the earlier action. In such cases, it is also immaterial
that the two actions are based on different grounds,
or tried on different theories, or instituted for different
purposes, and seek different relief." (See authorities in
Note 19 thereof).
30 American Jur. Page 923, Par. 179.
"The phase of the doctrine of res judicata precluding
subsequent litigation of the same cause of action is
much broader in its application than a determination
of the question involved in the prior action; the conclusiveness of the judgment in such case extends not
only to matters actually determined, but also to other
matters which could properly have been determined
in the prior action. This rule applies to every question
falling within the purview of the original action, in
respect to matters of both claims, and defense, which
could have been presented by the exercise of due diligense."
30 Am. Jur. Page 932, Par. 187.
"Notwithstanding the general rule that a judgment
rendered in an action involving a cause of action differ10
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ent from that involved in a subsequent action is not
conclusive as to matters not litigated in the former
action, there are many cases in which the doctrine of
res judicata is held or declared to be applicable to
defenses which were not raised, but which could properly have been considered and determined, in the prior
action, so that if the defendant neglects to set up the
defense, he is concluded as to the existence thereof
by the judgment rendered in the action, even though
the subsequent action involves a different cause of
action. In support of the rule, it has been held that a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff is in adjudication,
not merely as to the existence of the plaintiff's cause
of action, but, as to the non existence of any defenses
thereto. In justification of the rule, it has been declared
that a defendant should not be permitted to split his
defense and present them by piecemeal in successive
actions growing out of the same transaction, that there
must be an end to litigation, and that where a party
has an opportunity to present his defense and neglects
to do so the demands of the law require that he take the
consequences."
Stephani v. Abbott et al, 30 P. (2d) 1033. Calif.
"It is not the policy of the law to allow a new and
different suit between the same parties concerning the
same subject matter, that has already been litigated.
Neither will the law allow the parties to trifle with the
courts by piecemeal litigation. When plaintiff was
brought into court by defendant in the former case,
she certainly knew her rights. If she wished to rescind
the contract, or if she had rescinded it, as she said in
her answer she had done, then and there was the time
to present her pleadings and evidence, and insist upon
all rights to which she was entitled under the law.
If she could not get the award of the law upon the
facts in the lower court, she could have appealed. She
did not do so. She is now met by the presumption that
11
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all the facts and matters in controversy were disposed
of in the former suit, and the further presumption
that the judgment in the former suit is correct. If she
failed to assert her claim properly, or to present the
proper evidence in the first suit, she will not now be
permitted in a second to litigate it. The principles
herein stated are elementary."
Logan City vs. Utah Power and Light Co. 16 Pac. (2d) 1097,
Utah.
"It is well stated that it is the duty of a party to interpose such defenses as it may have to an action brought
against it, and, if it fails to do so, the resulting judgment is conclusive against it as to all matters of defense which were or might have been interposed. And
ilkewise a party to a judgment is not entitled to have
it vacated merely because of the existence of certain
matters of defense of which it fails to avail itself on
the trial."
Logan City v. Utah Power and Light Co., 44 Pac. (2d) 698.
Utah.
"And such a judgment is final, not only as to the
matter actually determined, but also as to every other
matter which might have been litigated by the parties,
as part of the subject in contrversy, but which was
omitted from the case through negligence, or inadvertence, or even accident."
Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716.
"These additional matters, relied upon in the answer
and which were stricken therefrom, could have been
set up in the former action, and, not having been
plea"ded in that case, the judgment became conclusive,
as an adjudication between the parties, not only as to
matters actually determined, but also as to every other

12
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matter which might have been litigated by the parties
as a part of the subject in controversy, but which was
omitted from the case through negligence or inadvertence."
Peay vs. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 331, 40 P. 206.
"The defendant can only be called upon to answer
the material allegations of the complaint, and upon
such allegations the issue is formed, and when judgment is rendered thereon by a court of exclusive jurisdiction, it is conclusive between the parties, upon the
same matters, unless set aside by a court of last resort.
And such a judgment is final, not only as to the matter
actually determined, but also as to every other matter
which might have been litigated by the parties, as
part of the subject in controversy, but which was
omitetd from the case through negligence, or inadverttnce, or even accident."
Gaskell et al vs. Wallace, 89 Pac. (2d) 687. Calif.
"It is equally well settled that a judgment rendered
in a court of competent jurisdiction is res judicata not
only on all questions actually litigated and decided,
but on all others that might have been litigated in
the action. A party is not permitted to split his demands
or defenses. In Elm v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit
Lands Co., 17 Pac ( 2d) 1003 this rule was thus announced:

"To this situation is clearly applicable the well established rule that matters in controversy in the actions
upon which it is based, but also in all other actions
involving the same question, and upon all matters involved in the issues which might have been litigated
and decided in the case; the presumption being that all
such issues were met and decided. (Cases cited) . The
judgment operates as res judicata, not only in regard
13
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to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action, but
as to the nonexistence of the defense which was not
pleaded.''
For further authorities on this identical question see the following:
C. J. S. Vol. 50 Paragraph 65 7
Curtiss v. Crooks, 66 Pac. 2nd 1140. Washington.
Besore v. Metropolitan Trust Co. et al. 234 Pac. (2d)
296.
Bennett v. City of Salem et al. 235 Pac. (2d) 772.
Oregon.
When the objection of the Appellant in this case to the
introduction of any evidence in support of the affirmative
defense of the Respondent was overruled, the court permitted
to be introduced in evidence, among other exhibits, the motion
of the Respondent for a rehearing before the Supreme Court
of Arizona, which is designated as Exhibit P-15. In this motion
the Respondent raises the very question that he pleads in his
affirmative defense in this action and contends the court should
have considered both of his theories raised by his complaint
(Exhibit P-14) in his first and second causes of actions, and
if the court will examine his complaint (Exhibit P-14) he pleads
therein the very defense he interposes in this action, which the
Appellant herein contends was fully determined and adjudicated in the former action. We quote from this motion:
"Comes now the Appellee in the above entitled appeal
and respectfully moves the court for a rehearing upon
the following grounds:
That the decision of the court is in error in holding
that the action was one solely to recover money loaned,
and in failing to consider the other theories of the
14
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complaint, and in holding that the evidence was not
sufficient to justify a recovery by the plaintiff, and
in reversing the judgment of the lower court in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants, for the reasons following:
1. The complaint set forth, in addition to a cause of
action for money loaned, a good cause of action to recover a down payment made under a preliminary contract wherein no provision was made for the forfeiture
of such down payment, and the parties had agreed that
the plaintiff might rescind the contract and recover
such down payment in the event his attorneys determined that the propetry being purchased was subject to certain Government regulations, as well as setting forth facts entitling plaintiff to recover said down
payment on the theory of unjust enrichment; and

2. The evidence was sufficient to show that the
amount sued for was loaned by planitiff to defendants;
and

3. The evidence did not show any agreement between
the parties for a forfeiture of said down payment; and
4. The evidence was sufficient to show that said down
payment was made under preliminary agreement as
alleged in the complaint and that plaintiff had the
right to thereunder rescind said contract and recover
such down payment; and
5. The evidence was sufficent to show that plaintiff
was entitled to recover said down payment under the
theory of unjust enrichment, and:
6. That in view of the whole case, substantial justice
was done by the lower court in entering judgment for
the plaintiff and against the defendant.
"It is clear from the allegations of the complaint
that there was a preliminary agreement between the

15
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parties which the plaintiff could rescind under certain
conditions, and that the sum of $5,000 paid by plaintiff
to defendants thereunder, was to be applied as a credit
on the purchase price if the sale was consummated . . .
Whether the transaction of the plaintiff paying the
defendants $5,000 under such an agreement is described as a loan or as a down payment is immaterial,
since it is clear under the allegations that said sum
was to be applied as a credit on the purchase price
if the final contract of sale was consummated . . .
Under the facts aleged, if the transaction did not
constitute a loan, then certainly it constituted a down
payment on the purchase price made under said preliminary agreement.
Further it is settled in this state that a party may set
forth in his complaint two or more claims, regardless
of consistency, and either in one count or in separate
counts, and need not show on appeal that both theories
were sustained by his evidence . . .
The court bases its decision upon the fact that the
trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on his
:first cause of action, for money loaned, rather than
on the second cause of action which set forth the facts
of a conditional agreement which was not consummated because the condition upon which it was based
was not fulfilled.
The record before the court shows that there was
never any requirement or demand made by the defendants for the plaintiff to elect which cause of action
it desired to pursue and consequently under the doctrine of substantial justice we respectfully submit that
the decision heretofore entered by this court be vacated and judgment entered in favor of the appellee,
since on either cause of action he was entitled to
prevail over the appallant."

16
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I have quoted briefly from the motion of Respondent
above referred to for the purpose of substantiating the position
of the Appellant herein, that the very defense attempted to
be interposed by the Respondent herein was both pleaded in
his complaint before the Superior Court of Arizona, and the
very question he raises by his motion for a rehearing before
the Supreme Court of Arizona was ruled upon, by both courts,
and his motion for a rehearing was denied. The case was remanded to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for
the defendants (Appellants herein).
By the denial of the motion for a rehearing of the Respondent herein before the Supreme Court of the State of
Arizona, every consideration was given by said court to the
very contention the Respondent attempts to plead and prove
in this case, and such denial of his said motion constitutes an
adjudication of the merits of this case, and said Respondent
cannot now interpose his affirmative defense, and retry the
case before this court.
(b) That said purported affirmative defense cannot
be interposed in an action on a judgment as a set
off or counterclaim.

30 Am. Jur. page 9?J7, Par. 193.
"On the theory that matters which have once been
fully investigated between the parties and determined
by the court shall not again be contested, the doctrine
of res judicata as to a cause of action which has been
litigated has been held to prevail where such cause
of action was attempted to be interposed as an offset in
a subsequent action between the same parties. 77 N.E.
40, N.Y. 181 U.S. 117,45 Led. 776 3 L. R. A. NS 1042.

17
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I quote the above for the reason that in the findings of
fact in this case the court allowed a judgment for the Respondent as a set off and which the Appellant herein contends
is an error of the court.
(c) That the court is bound to conform to the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the
United States in giving full faith and credit to
the judgment of a sister state.
Thompson v. William Ede Co., 103 Pac. (2d) 530. Oklahoma.
"The action being one of a judgment of a sister
state it was not open to re-examination upon its merits.''
Reed vs. Hollister, 212 Pac. 367, Oregon.
·'The right to enforce this judgment the force and
effect to be given to it is protected and guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States. The courts
of this state have no power to go behind it or to reexamine it upon its merits. On the contrary it is conclusive evidence of every matter properly adjudicated
and is entitled to the same faith and credit in this state
as in the state where rendered."
35 Am. Jur. Page 145, Par. 535.
"Under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States, a judgment rendered by
a court of one state is, in the courts of another state
of the Union, binding, and conclusive, as to the merits
adjudicated. It is improper to permit an alteration or
re-examination of the judgment, or of the grounds
on which it is based."
50 C. J. S. Page 493, Par. 891
"Under the ful faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution and the general rules discussed supra, a
18
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final valid judgment on the merits rendered by a competent court having jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter is conclusive in every other state and the
merits cannot be reinvestigated. The full faith and
credit clause of the Federal Constitution precludes any
inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logical or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the
legal principles, on which the judgment is based.
"A judgment in another state by a court having
jurisdiction is conclusive not only as to all matters
which were actually in issue and decided in that suit,
or which were necessarily implied in, or to be inferred
from the judgment, in the sense that the judgment
could not have been rendered without the finding or
determination of such matters, but also as to other
matters, which the parties might have litigated and
which might have been decided as incident to, or
essentially connected with, the subject matter of the
litigation within the purview of the original action,
either as a matter of claim or of defense.
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449, 72 L. Ed 365.
"It is settled by repeated decisions of this court
that the full faith and credit clause of the constitution
requires that the judgment of a State Court which had
jurisdiction of the parties, and the subject matter in
suit, shall be given in the courts of every other state
the same credit, validity and effect which it has in the
State where it was rendered, and be equally conclusive upon the merits; ... and the judgment, if valid
where rendered, must be enforced in such other State
although repugnant to its own statutes."

Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland vs. Clanton, 28 Pac. ( 2d)
566. Oklahoma.
"The obligation to accord full faith and credit to
a valid judgment, other than for lack of jurisdiction
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of the person or subject matter, or for the enforcement
of a penalty, is without limitation. Also the constitutional and statutory provisions referred to protect a
judgment of a court of a sister state against collateral
impeachment.''
The foregoing law is elementary, but we quote the foregoing for the reason of reference to the law, and for the further purpose that the judgment herein sued upon was never
attacked by the Respondent for any irregularities, or grounds
provided by law to impeach such a judgment, and the same
is regular and not questioned.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE OBJECTION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY EVIDENCE OF THE RESPONDENT IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S FIRST AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE AND THAT SAID DEFENSE DOES NOT
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT
TO ANY RELIEF.
Without further discussion of the above point, we feel
that the argument and the authorities set forth in Point 1 above
covers the error of the court in overruling the objections of
the Appellant herein to the introduction of any evidence on
the part of the Respondent in support of his affirmative defense and permitting this case to be tried anew.
We do however respectfully request the court to examine
the evidence as contained in Exhibit P-17 of this case, which
20
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is a transcript of the evidence of the case as tried in the Superior
Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa. There was no new evidence produced in the case before
the lower court. It was substantially the same evidence that
was introduced in the Superior Court of Arizona. This cannot
be done, as the Respondent is precluded from trying this
case again on the merits by reason of the law pertaining to
res judicata, estoppel and the full faith and credit provision
of the Constitution of the United States as is substantially
set forth in the authorities hereinabove.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
FOR THE RESPONDENT.
We anticipate that the Respondent will contend that the
Court of Arizona did not adjudicate this matter fully and did
not take into consideration the second theory of Respondent's
cause of action, and that he has a right to interpose such a
defense in this action on this judgment. We feel that what
has been outlined by Appellants in their argument in support
of Point I herein has fully covered this without elaborating
more in support of Point III, we feel that the following is very
enlightening and a determining factor in this matter:
50 C. ]. S. Page 141, Page 686.
"A fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined
by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity
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with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or privies, in the same court
or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, on either
the same of different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed, unmodified, or unvacted by
proper authority. This Doctrine of the conclusiveness
of judgment is sometimes referred to alternatively as
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and, as judicially
noted, it is simple and universally recognized in almost
innumerable cases.
The force of the estoppel lies in the judgment itself;
it is not the findings of the court or the verdict of the
jury which concludes the parties, but the judgment
itself entered thereon. Likewise the conclusiveness of
an adjudication depends on the source from which it
came and the issues it determined, and not on the violence of the controversy. The reasoning of the court
in rendering a judgment forms no part of the judgment, with respect to its conclusiveness, nor are the
parties bound by remarks made or opinions expressed
by the court in deciding the cause, which do not necessarily enter into the judgment."
We respectfully submit that the District Court erred
m entering judgment for the Respondent in this case. The
judgment sued on in this case was never attacked by the Respondent, either in his pleadings or in his evidence and as
long as the judgment of the Superior Court of Arizona, sued
on herein, stands, the court was without authority to again try
this case on the merits.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
FOR THE RESPONDENT FOR THE SUM OF $5,000.00
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AND INTEREST THEREON IN THE SUM OF $647.50,
OR A NET JUDGMENT OF $399.95, AS A SET OFF OR
COUNTERCLAIM OR OTHERWISE.
Upon what theory the court found a judgment in the
net sum of $399.95 in favor of the Respondent and against
the Appellant, we are unable to determine, (Tr. 93-94-95)
other than the fact that the Appellant had the sum of $5,000.00
in their possession for a short time after the judgment was
entered in favor of Respondent in the Superior Court of Arizona. It was conceded by Respondent that the $5,000.00 was
returned to the Respondent by Appellants herein shortly after
the judgment was rendered and such a finding was so made
in the pre-trial of the lower court, Paragraph 5, (Tr. 10) and
no issue was raised on that question, nor was any affirmative
relief demanded or pleaded by Respondent, nor evidence introducd on this point. While there is nothing in the record
of this case, either by way of evidence or pleadings with respect to interest being allowed on the $5,000.00 in question,
while it was in the possession of Appellants, the court concludes that the Respondent was entitled to interest. From what
source the lower court concludes this we are unable to determine, and for that reason we respectfully submit it was not
within the court's jurisdiction to make such a finding or conclusion or judgment in this respect.
Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN SPENCE
Attorney for Appellant
1401 Walker Bank Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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